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MERIT VS. IDEOLOGY
Michael J. Gerhardt*
INTRODUCTION
In a provocative article, Stephen Choi of Boalt Hall Law School
and Mitu Gulati of Georgetown University Law Center have suggested
a tournament to determine the “best” judge in the United States.1 They
have proposed objective data and criteria for measuring which circuit
court judges are the best qualified candidates for appointment to the
United States Supreme Court.
Their project has been met with some skepticism in the legal
academy. Some legal scholars doubt whether merit can be objectively
measured; some believe Choi and Gulati’s criteria for measuring merit
are flawed; others believe that merit depends on, or at least includes
several factors Choi and Gulati do not take into account; and some
believe that Choi and Gulati fail to develop criteria that would allow for
measuring the quality of a large number of other qualified people from
federal district courts, state courts, academia, and public or
governmental service.
I call attention to Choi and Gulati’s project because I happen to
like it. In particular, it does at least three things absent from the vast
majority of legal commentaries on judicial selection. First, Choi and
Gulati are willing to discuss merit. They do not just focus on what has
gone wrong with a particular nomination or with the confirmation
process. Their focus is not on what is ailing in the process but on what
we might be able to find positive within it. Second, they eschew labels.
They refuse to play the popular game of pigeon-holing judges based on
their supposed ideology, or pre-commitments, to certain outcomes or
ways of thinking about constitutional issues, regardless of the facts of
particular cases.2 They refuse to characterize candidates in extreme
terms. Their concern is with merit, plain and simple. They propose
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School; Visiting Fellow, James
Madison Program in American Institutions and Ideals, Princeton University, Spring 2004.
1 Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004).
2 See generally Should Ideology Matter: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearings Before
Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Hearings].
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criteria for measuring how well judges do their jobs. Third, they dare to
employ empirical analysis in assessing the quality of a particular
judge’s performance on the bench. Social scientists make their living
employing and critiquing empirical analyses of public and private
behavior, even in studying judicial selection, and some of these social
scientists are highly critical of what they regard as the lack of rigor in
legal scholars’ empirical analysis or their disdain for such analysis.3
Empirical analysis is common to the fields of corporate law, securities,
and law and economics; however, it is uncommon in legal scholarship
assessing either judicial performance or the federal judicial selection
process.
In this essay, I will use each of three different factors that I believe
distinguish Choi and Gulati’s project as lenses through which to discuss
the apparent tension between merit and ideology in the federal judicial
selection process, including the curious reluctance of many public
officials and legal scholars to find an objective, or at least consensusbuilding, measure of merit to guide critical assessment of judicial
nominations. I also illuminate the risks of trying to analyze the judicial
selection process without taking into account each of the three factors.
In Part I, I assess different possible definitions of merit that could
be used for measuring judicial performance. Examining these helps to
illuminate the relationship between merit and ideology. In Part II, I
examine the benefits of eschewing the labeling of judicial nominees on
the basis of their supposed ideologies. Principal among these is that it
frees us from the misleading and value-laden rhetoric commonly
deployed for assessing judicial nominations. Because of ideological
drift and other factors, the categories most scholars and others use in
analyzing judicial performance are not static. In Part III, I address the
challenges of constructing an empirical test for determining the relative
impact of different factors on the fate of judicial nominations. These
challenges need to be met in order for us to move beyond the unfounded
assumption that ideology significantly matters to outcomes in the
confirmation process.
I. MERIT
It is rare in symposia or other studies on judicial selection to talk at
length about merit. This reticence is surprising because it elides a basic
question that presumably is of great interest to everyone concerned
about the quality of judging: how do we measure fitness for office and
3 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002),
available at http://polmeth.wustl.edu/papers/01/king02/pdf.
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particularly how do we determine who is best qualified for appointment
to the United States Supreme Court? Before I discuss possible answers
to this question, I consider briefly why legal academics and political
leaders do not discuss merit in greater detail and with more candor than
they do.
A.

The Reticence on Merit

It is unclear why we fail to discuss merit more than we do. It is
possible that when it comes to merit, we might all agree on more than
what our leaders or academics typically acknowledge. It is possible, in
other words, that we have greater consensus on merit than we know.
Yet, if we have such consensus, it is unclear why it is not more
prominent in discussions about, or debate within, the confirmation
process. If, however, we cannot agree on what constitutes merit, this
may be because we implicitly acknowledge that factors besides merit
may be more important to the choices of whom to nominate and
confirm.
Social scientists are largely, but by no means wholly, in agreement
that merit is not pertinent to judicial selection. On their view, judges do
one of two things: they either vote their policy preferences directly4 or
manipulate legal materials to maximize their policy or personal
preferences.5 Hence, social scientists largely argue that judicial
selection is based on ideology, a predisposition to certain constitutional
commitments, regardless of the facts of particular cases. As Harold
Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal argue, the justices who are appointed reflect
the values, or preferences, of the governing elite.6 Once on the bench,
they become nothing more than policymakers who simply happen to
wear robes.
Imagining merit as distinct from ideology is no easy task. Indeed,
no one seriously thinks that President George W. Bush has been using
the same criteria that President Clinton employed in choosing which
people to nominate to district and circuit court judgeships. Instead, we
strongly suspect, based on leaks and outcomes that President Bush is
considering different sets of judicial nominees than President Clinton
did. The differences in these nominees go beyond mere party
affiliations or allegiances; they reflect differences in experience,
political commitments and service, and attitudes about how to decide
constitutional cases. These attitudes are what some people might call
4 See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
5 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
6 See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 4.
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ideological commitments.
Yet, it is reasonable to wonder whether there are any selection
criteria on which Presidents Bush and Clinton or their respective
advisers would agree. They apparently did agree on two nominees—
Judges Roger Gregory and Barrington Parker, Jr.—whom they
nominated and who were ultimately confirmed by the Republican-led
Senate in 2001.7 Presidents Clinton and Bush would each claim that
they had nominated the “best qualified” people as federal judges, but
such claims implicate the question of how do we determine merit, or
who are the best qualified people for judicial appointments? It is not
immediately clear why or how both presidents could be appointing the
best qualified people given that they appear to have been nominating
quite different kinds of people to judgeships: people with different
backgrounds, political experience, party affiliations, sponsors, and
attitudes.
Given these circumstances, the usual refrain from legal scholars is
to insist that ideology matters, that it frequently makes the critical
difference in whom the President nominates or whom the Senate
confirms to Article III courts, and thus we need to focus on the likely
ideologies of judicial nominees in evaluating whether they ought to be
confirmed. Walter Dellinger’s proposed solution to the impasse over
some of President Bush’s judicial nominees has the distinct virtue of
smoking out whether ideology is what matters most to each side.8 He
proposes that each president agree to nominate at least one of a preselected few people approved by the opposition party in exchange for a
relatively smooth confirmation process for every three or four people he
prefers to appoint to a particular circuit court of appeals. For instance,
in exchange for his getting Miguel Estrada, Bret Kavanaugh, and Tom
Griffith appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia,9 President Bush would be obliged to nominate someone from
a group of potential nominees approved by the Democratic caucus in the
Senate. If the President were to refuse, then, Dellinger argues, it can
7 In his final year in office, President Clinton nominated Roger Gregory and Barrington
Parker, Jr. to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for the Second Circuit,
respectively. The Senate never acted on those nominations. Consequently, President Clinton in
his last month in office designated both people as recess appointees to their respective courts of
appeals. These appointments would have expired at the end of the next congressional session. In
March of his first year in office, President George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees to
the federal courts of appeals, including Gregory to the Fourth Circuit and Parker to the Second
Circuit.
8 See Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23.
9 Estrada, Kavanaugh, and Griffith are three people on whose nominations by President
Bush to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia the Senate never acted on.
Democrats successfully blocked a floor vote on Estrada’s nomination, while the Judiciary
Committee never acted on either Kavanaugh’s or Griffith’s nomination. I do not know Estrada
personally, but I do know both Kavanaugh and Griffith. They have very kindly and generously
given their time to lecture, more than once, to my classes.
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only be because he clearly prefers not to compromise his prerogative to
take ideology into account in nominating judges.
Dellinger poses a powerful test of presidential commitment to
ideological criteria for judicial nominations. Nevertheless, it is possible
that presidents may zealously protect their nominating authority—as
did, for instance, Presidents Tyler and Madison in the 19th century10—
for reasons other than their desire to ensure the ideological purity of
their judicial nominations. Presidents may wish to preserve their
autonomy to nominate people to judgeships for such other reasons as
rewarding personal or party fealty, currying the favor of particular
senators or constituencies, and broadening the diversity of the federal
judiciary. Of course, none of these reasons for appointment is mutually
exclusive from fulfilling certain ideological criteria. It is possible that
presidents, or at least their advisers, might define merit as an additional
criterion for nomination or perhaps the critical factor for choosing
among potential nominees or for determining the potential sets of
nominees for particular judgeships. Indeed, some presidents, or their
advisers, might define merit as including a particular ideological
orientation with respect to constitutional interpretation. It is not
unprecedented by any means for presidents to select people as nominees
based on the extent to which the nominees conform to the presidents’
notions as to the duties they expect judges or justices to perform.
President Reagan, for instance, seems to have defined merit, at least in
part, as including certain ideological commitments.11 He insisted that
his staff and senators recommend candidates for judicial nominations
that fit particular criteria, including a rigid commitment to original
understanding in all cases. Thus, merit may not be neatly severed from
ideology. It thus becomes necessary to examine different ways in
which we can define merit and whether severing merit from ideology is
possible, or in what ways, merit can be determined without any
reference to ideology.
B.

Imagining the Ideal Nominee

Imagine, for a moment, you have been asked by the President to
draft a list of qualifications for a nominee to the Supreme Court.
Imagine further that you do not know which particular president has
made this request. You are behind the Rawlsean veil of ignorance12 as
10 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 2003).
11 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power:

Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003).
12 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
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to knowing anything particular about the President’s party or the
composition of the Senate. Is it possible to draft such a list, and if so,
what would be on it?
It is not hard to imagine that some criteria are bound to make the
list, though reaching consensus on the activities that would satisfy them
may be difficult. First, we expect a nominee to have a high degree of
legal acumen. We expect the nominee to be highly intelligent, perhaps
to have performed quite well in law school, maybe even to have
attended an elite law school. At the very least, we would want to make
sure that the nominee has very sound legal skills; asks intelligent,
probing questions; thinks clearly if not imaginatively about legal
problems; identifies legal issues in a wide range of problems; is trained
at problem-solving; and understands the special duties that she will be
called upon to discharge.
Second, we expect a nominee to have an excellent judicial
temperament. The ideal temperament for a justice is presumably to
have the capacity to make decisions even-handedly, to be open-minded
in listening to and considering the arguments in the cases that come
before him, and to be respectful to litigants and other justices with
differing opinions. A judicial temperament requires, of course, a
disposition to follow, rather than to rewrite, the law. The nominee also
needs to be able to handle the intense pressures that come with the
responsibilities of a Supreme Court Justice.
Collegiality is a third criterion for an ideal nominee to the Court.
Collegiality requires getting along with the other justices. It also entails
being able to build coalitions and to maintain cordial relations with
other justices, regardless of the extent to which one may agree or
disagree with their views in particular cases. Maintaining cordial
relations is no easy feat on a Court once described by Justice Holmes as
“nine scorpions in a bottle.”13 Not all people who must work together in
relatively close quarters successfully maintain respect and civility over
long periods of time, but the ideal nominee must have some such
capability.
The fourth criterion for the ideal nominee is excellent writing
ability. The ideal nominee should be able to write clear, coherent
opinions. It is especially important that the ideal nominee have the
ability to craft opinions that reflect and can maintain the support of a
majority of the justices in a given case. Moreover, it is important for
the nominee to be able to compose opinions relatively quickly given the
time pressures under which justices operate.
Fifth, significant and meaningful professional experience is
indispensable to an ideal nominee to the Court. This experience need
13 MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1994).
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not all have been in the public sector, but the more experience a
nominee has first-hand with the legal system from top to bottom the
better. Meaningful experience might include serving in a significant
public office, which might enrich the nominee’s understanding of the
system from which the laws appealed to her Court will come. Rich
professional experience is bound to sharpen a nominee's judgments, and
provide a solid foundation from which to approach the significant legal
questions that come routinely before the Supreme Court.
Sixth, integrity is essential to the ideal nominee. A nominee’s
integrity must be beyond question in order for her to be able to exercise
the moral authority of a Supreme Court justice. Justices embody the
law, and they need to comply with the very laws they expect all others
to follow.
Closely related to nominees’ integrity is their character. Stephen
Carter and Larry Solum are just two of the many scholars who insist
that a justice ought to have a strong, moral character.14 At the very
least, having a strong, moral character means having the courage of
one’s convictions and the strength not to alter one’s opinions, or decide
cases, for the sake of currying peer or public esteem.
There are other qualifications that ideal nominees might arguably
need to satisfy. Besides the factors already mentioned, presidents might
also be interested in a nominee’s religion, ethnicity, gender, and health.
These other factors might be important in diversifying the Court’s
composition or satisfying under-represented segments of society.
Moreover, the age of a nominee has been very important to presidents
who wanted to ensure that their appointee could serve on the Court long
after they had left office.
Of course, the criteria that are relevant for determining ideal
nominees are one thing, while the things which presidents or their
advisers might consider in order to measure them are another. The
values of those charged with selecting a nominee will inevitably
influence what they choose to look at and how they will perceive it.
Moreover, it might simply be unrealistic—or dangerous—to ignore
factors such as timing, the president’s party, the composition of the
Senate, the nominee’s political or party affiliation, or the composition of
the Court. For instance, the composition of the Senate might be quite
pertinent to a nominee’s chances for confirmation. Indeed, a president
might be inclined to choose different people, depending on whether his
party controls the Senate or whether the minority has enough members
to filibuster a contested nomination. Certain factors are bound to
complicate the nominating process. For instance, the proximity of the
14 See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD’S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF
RELIGION IN POLITICS, (2000); Lawrence Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 659 (2004).
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next presidential election cannot be ignored, because the opposing party
has successfully rejected or delayed more than a few Supreme Court
nominees in the hopes of preserving the vacancies for presidents from
their parties.15 And we have not yet mentioned a nominee’s likely
ideology or how well a potential candidate interviews for the job as
possible complicating factors.
The large number of potential considerations helps to explain why
some presidents, or their advisers, might prefer to break the nominating
process into first- and second-order selection criteria. The first might
allow for a relatively sizeable list of potential candidates, while the
second might be used to cut the list down to size, if not down to one.
Interviews might be used to cut a narrowed list even further, at which
point a great deal depends on the interviewer, the questions asked, and
the nominees’ responses.
It is possible that recognizing the large numbers of potential
considerations discourages academics from pondering the qualifications
of ideal nominees to the Court. Academics might view such an exercise
as futile, for they appreciate that Supreme Court nominees are not
chosen in a vacuum. Yet, neither senators nor academics hesitate to
evaluate nominees on the basis of some criteria. A question thus
remains as to the appropriate criteria for measuring the quality of a
particular nomination. Of course, the fact that a nomination falls short
of an ideal is not necessarily an argument against it. A Supreme Court
nominee usually enters the confirmation phase with at least a
presumption, or likelihood, that he or she will be confirmed.16 It thus
usually takes something rather significant—not just some deviation
from an ideal—to put a nomination in trouble. Nevertheless, the
stronger a nominee’s credentials, or the more closely he or she
approximates an ideal, the tougher it may be to undermine the
nomination. Thus, a look at another way in which to determine ideal
credentials might be fruitful for providing at least one significant
measure for evaluating the relative strengths of particular nominations.
C.

Determining Merit in Reverse

The prior section examined possible selection criteria on which
there might be consensus at the outset of a selection process. This
section considers determining qualifications by looking at merit in
reverse; whether it is possible to infer from the justices we might
generally agree were “great” or “excellent” what they might have had in
15 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON (1999).
16 See GERHARDT, supra note 10, at 182.
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common prior to their appointments. The question is whether the signs
of at least potential “greatness” or “excellence” were evident at the
times of the appointments of those who later proved themselves to be
first-rate justices.
I will use two examples to illustrate this tack. The first is the man
for whom this Law Review takes its name: Justice Benjamin Cardozo.
Justice Cardozo makes many, if not all, the lists of great justices, so the
question naturally arises as to whether, or in what ways, this greatness
was evident at the time of his nomination. Throughout his career—first
as a lawyer specializing in appellate briefs, then as a judge and later
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Cardozo, nominally a
Democrat, had enjoyed the confidence of all political factions.17
Achieving this level of confidence was especially significant because he
did it in an era when state courts and his court especially were widely
revered. He was also the author of several highly regarded books, and
had received honorary degrees from many universities, including Yale,
Columbia (his alma mater), and Harvard. Many of his decisions in such
areas as torts and contracts had influenced judges and courts throughout
the nation. Thus, he evidently had, by the time of his appointment,
compiled ample judicial experience, shown considerable legal acumen,
and demonstrated excellent judicial temperament, collegiality, and
leadership on a prominent court. His integrity and character were
beyond reproach.
My second example involves another New Yorker, Charles Evans
Hughes, whom many believe was a first-rate jurist (not once but twice!).
When Hughes was first nominated and confirmed to the Supreme Court
in 1910, he already had outstanding credentials.18 He had been an
active practitioner with one of the leading law firms in the country and a
leader of the New York and national bars, and had devoted himself to
substantial public service. At the time President Taft appointed Hughes
as an Associate Justice, Hughes was serving with distinction as the
Governor of New York. As an Associate Justice, Hughes authored a
number of significant opinions and demonstrated respect for his
colleagues and opposing arguments and had an even-handed
temperament.
After leaving the Court six years later to run
unsuccessfully for President of the United States, he served as President
of the American Bar Association, argued several cases successfully
before the Supreme Court, performed significant pro bono work, served
for four years as secretary of state under Presidents Harding and
Coolidge, and served on the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Few nominees to the Court have matched his record of public service
17
18

See generally ANDREW KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
See Charles Evans Hughes, at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/justices/past
justices/hughes.html.
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prior to the Court, and fewer have had records of public service
respected by the leaders of both parties, though this did not save him
from having a significant minority of senators vote against his
nomination as Chief Justice for fear of his allegiance to big business.
Hughes brought statesmanship to the task of judging.
My point is not to suggest that either Cardozo or Hughes ought to
be viewed as the model appointee to the Court. Rather, my point is that
if we are sincerely interested in measuring merit we might be able to
infer from their records, as of the respective times of these two widely
respected jurists’ appointments, appropriate criteria for meritorious
appointments to the Court. It is, however, not clear that we can ever
discuss merit without some reference to ideology. Indeed, we know that
most presidents and senators are preoccupied with ideology in assessing
judicial nominees. Consequently, we need to consider the implications
of the linkage of merit to ideology in the federal judicial selection
process.
II. THE BATTLE OVER THE MAINSTREAM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The reasons for the attraction, or dominance, of ideology in
judicial selection are obvious. First, national political leaders care about
ideology because of the high stakes involved in judicial appointments.
They understand that Article III judges enjoy life tenure and thus are
immune from political retaliation against their decisions. Judicial
opinions on constitutional law cannot be overturned through ordinary
legislation but only by a superior court or the Court itself, or through the
extraordinary means of a constitutional amendment. Consequently,
national political leaders will spend a good deal of time trying to ensure
that the people appointed as judges will exercise power in ways that are
satisfactory to them. Second, national political leaders have almost no
incentive to reach any consensus on merit. Most citizens pay little or no
attention to lower court appointments, so leaders can expect little or no
public backlash against their decisions on lower court appointments. In
addition, presidents and senators are reluctant to relinquish their
institutional prerogatives in the selection process. When they do so, it is
only in exchange for something else that they have decided is more
important to them, at least for the moment. There is little or no apparent
political up-side to emphasizing merit, except in defense of embattled
nominations. Presidents and senators might sometimes have incentives
to reach accommodations, but accommodations are much harder to
come by for presidents and senators from the opposition party.
Presidents from one party and senators from the other often need
conflict to sharpen the differences between them and to call attention to
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the stakes involved in the selection process. Agreeing on merit would
merely reduce, rather than preserve or expand, senators’ discretion in
subsequent confirmation proceedings.
Perhaps the most intense conflict that Republicans and Democrats
have had over the past two decades in the selection process has been
over who occupies the mainstream in constitutional law. Each side
claims that its nominees are within the mainstream and the contested
nominees of the other are not, as evidenced by the struggle over the
Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork.19
More recently,
Democrats have supported six filibusters against judicial nominees
whose views on constitutional issues are, in their judgment, outside of
the mainstream. The defenders argue that just the opposite is true.20
The contest to define the mainstream has not been merely
rhetorical. A good deal is at stake. Each side desperately wants its
nominees to be viewed as occupying the middle, rather than the extreme
end of the spectrum in constitutional law. The middle is the safest,
strongest ground. Moreover, opposing nominees because they are
outside the mainstream puts the other side on the defensive. More
importantly, each side appreciates the enormous stakes involved, for
with each victory each side advances one step further in building a
foundation for an enduring constitutional vision. The vision is
important in guiding not just other judicial nominations but also the
exercise of presidential and legislative authority. The prize is shaping
constitutional law for at least the foreseeable future.
Although it is not hard to understand why political leaders care
intensely about securing the mainstream—or the middle—in
constitutional law, it is harder for someone outside of, or not invested
in, the process to determine what counts as the middle. I consider in the
next section some of the difficulties with determining the mainstream in
constitutional law and propose some ways in which to figure out what is
the mainstream, or middle.
A.

Problems with Defining the Middle in Constitutional Law

There are several major problems with identifying the mid-ground
in contemporary constitutional law. First, empirical analysis cannot
easily capture what counts as the middle because the choices of what to
19 See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
20 See Is the Constitutional Option Viable to Break Partisan Filibusters Against Judicial
Nominees, at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_issues/federal_issues/hot_issues_in_congress
/confirmation_watch/constitutional_option.htm; Sean Grindlay, Judges Deserve a Fair Hearing
in the Media (Nov. 20, 2003), at http://www.aim.org/briefing_print/99_0_5_0/; James L.
Swanson, The Coming Battle for the Court, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/04-29-03-2.html.
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emphasize or count are value-laden. Anyone looking to define the
middle, or the mainstream (the two are not necessarily the same) in
constitutional law must make judgments about relevance: are all cases
relevant? Should we only look at the judgments or outcomes in
particular cases, or should we also look at the reasoning, including its
quality and extent? Where, for instance, do seemingly obvious cases
like Roe v. Wade,21 Lawrence v. Texas,22 and Lee v. Weisman23 fit?
Some might argue that they are clearly on the “left” in constitutional
law, but some others might argue they are consistent with a libertarian
perspective on the right. Arguing that one or the other of these
positions is correct is just another value judgment.
Second, an even bigger problem for defining the middle or the
mainstream in constitutional law is that the categories we deploy in
assessing judicial performance as well as the nominees’ views are not
necessarily fixed. Because of the phenomenon of ideological drift,
categories are not static; particular perspectives on constitutional law
associated with particular political factions may over time be
appropriated by or become associated with different political factions.24
For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall reflected a “conservative”
rather than a “liberal” perspective on constitutional law, because he
usually favored the status quo. His successor as Chief Justice of the
United States, Roger Taney, was understood, at the time of his
appointment, as representing a “liberal” perspective on constitutional
law because he was thought to favor progressive legislation and reform
of the status quo. It is only because of ideological drift that each is now
viewed differently.25 New Deal liberals found they had a lot in common
with the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, because of their consistent
support for a strong national government; and conservatives admired
Taney’s ardent efforts to resist the expansion of the national
government at the expense of state sovereignty.
The labels “liberal” and “conservative” do not fit contemporary
justices much better. For instance, Justice John Paul Stevens, appointed
to the Court in 1976 by President Ford, is frequently described as a
“liberal” by commentators and critics.26 Yet, he hardly seems to have
much in common with other “liberals” such as Associate Justices
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, with whom he sat for many
21
22
23
24

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint to the
Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-38 (2002).
25 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399
(2002).
26 See John Paul Stevens, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=404877&query=
john%20ford&ct; http:www.issues2000.org/John_Paul_Stevens.htm.
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years. Nor does it seem appropriate to describe Justices Kennedy and
O’Connor as strictly “conservative” because they have often favored
protecting state sovereignty in Commerce Clause and Eleventh
Amendment cases.27 They also have voted to re-affirm the embattled
decision in Roe v. Wade,28 to strike down all anti-sodomy laws in
Lawrence v. Texas,29 and to strike down Virginia Military Institute’s
policy to exclude women.30 It is probably more accurate to describe
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor as today’s moderates, though many
senators would resist this label because it cedes the middle ground to
these justices rather than others they might prefer to place there.
A third problem with fixing the middle ground in constitutional
law is that justices sometimes shift their attitudes about constitutional
law either generally or in particular cases. Justice Harry Blackmun is
often described as evolving, or growing, over time into a more “liberal”
justice.31 Others might move in the other direction. Spaeth and Segal
claim, that Justices Stevens and Souter each became more “liberal” over
time, while Justice White became more “conservative” over time.32 As
Chief Justice William Rehnquist has sometimes been said to have
moderated some views,33 as he arguably did in writing the Court’s
opinions reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona,34 concurring in the Virginia
Military Institute decision,35 and upholding the Family Leave Act as an
exercise of Congress’ authority pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment in Nevada v. Hibbs.36
A related problem with using the categories of “liberal” and
“conservative” to describe judicial performance is that judicial
nominees may not have fixed attitudes about constitutional law. Some
people seem to assume that at least some nominees have ideological
commitments at the times of their nominations that are impervious to
change, but it seems virtually impossible to prove that this is true
especially when the nominees themselves disclaim holding any such
commitments.
Fifth, legal academics have done little to illuminate what may fall
27 See Otis H. Stephens, Jr. & John M. Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Overview of
the Supreme Court’s 1993 Term, at http://www.web.utk.edu/~scheb/93term.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005).
28 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
31 See Harry Blackmun, at http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=382716&query=
houdini%2C%20harry&ct (last visited Jan. 22, 2005); http://www.cnn.com/US/9903/04/black
mun.02/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
32 See SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 4, at 218.
33 See http://www.michaelariens.com/ConLaw/justices/rehnquist.htm.
34 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
35 See Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
36 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
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inside or outside the mainstream of constitutional law. Most legal
scholars appear interested less in finding common ground than in
delivering the knock-out punch against opposing points of view.37 A
common goal of legal scholarship is paradigm-shifting, but in pursuing
this goal legal scholars will dismiss as wrong or dangerous points of
view affiliated with the paradigms they are trying to undo. The pursuit
of this goal is not likely to enrich our understanding of which views
actually do rather than ought to fall within the mainstream of American
constitutional law.
Sixth, the media hinders sophisticated discussions of judicial
performance. The media has begun to shirk its traditional role in
educating the public. It has moved from reporting “hard” news or facts
and figures to reporting “soft” news or speculation and commentary.38
The proliferation of media outlets and twenty-four hour news has put
enormous pressure on newspapers and television reporters to emphasize
scandal. The media prefers drama and conflict, because it gets people’s
attention. The media thus prefers to stick with the simple labels of
“liberal” and “conservative.”
As candidates and commentators
increasingly feel the need to characterize opponents in extreme terms,
the media follows suit. Candidates are thus “liberal” or “conservative,”
and Justices are also one or the other. No one apparently begins as a
moderate, or ends up as one. The middle in politics appears to be an
unoccupied ground that the candidates fight to control, while the media
simply covers the flashier portions of the fight.
B.

Sketching the Middle

Assessing ideologies is difficult without having some yardstick
with which to measure them. It is possible that the measurement of an
ideology is a purely normative matter, depending on its appeal to
lawmakers and its consistency with constitutional law as they
understand it. Even then, we need to define the middle, or moderation,
as a means of curbing reckless or misleading rhetoric. We need our
rhetoric to fit the complicated business of judging. So, the question is
how accurately can we describe a middle course or the contours of the
mainstream in constitutional law?
I offer a few possible answers, taking into account each of the
37 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
175 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever By Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional
Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921 (2001).
38 See MARVIN KALB, ONE SCANDALOUS STORY: CLINTON, LEWINSKY AND THIRTEEN
DAYS THAT TARNISHED AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2001); BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL,
WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF THE MIXED MEDIA (1999).
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difficulties described above. First, we can identify the middle ground as
what each of the contending sides in confirmation contests seeks to
occupy. We can thus define it at least as an aspiration. We can assess
nominees based on how well they fit the description of the middle
ground, or mainstream, of their supporters. One problem with this
definition is that it might allow one side to define the terms on which it
prefers for its nominees to be assessed, without any second-guessing;
however, this understanding of the mainstream puts pressure on
supporters to be careful about how they characterize nominees or risk
having them fail to meet expectations.
A second possibility is to define the mainstream as the pool of
people who have made it successfully through the confirmation process.
They constitute a large and diverse pool, which reflects the approval of
the governing elite. The problem with this understanding of the
mainstream is that it fails to take into account the facts that many people
make it through the process without close scrutiny and that presidents
and senators have not agreed with everything decided by the judges
whom they have approved.
Moreover, defining the mainstream as those whom the Senate has
confirmed merely gives each side an incentive to push the envelope.
With each victory in the confirmation process, each party has expanded
the possibilities for its nominees. Once people are confirmed, their
parties can point to them as examples, or precedents, to guide future
confirmation proceedings.
A more interesting but speculative test might be to ask whether the
President would still nominate, or the Senate still approve, the same
judges if they knew what kinds of decisions they would make. In many
cases, nominees are relatively blank slates, and judges and justices
presumably fulfill special obligations independent from presidential and
senatorial influence. So, it might not be fair to attribute to presidents
and senators all the decisions made by the judges and justices they have
approved.
Third, the mainstream could be understood as simply consisting of
the views of those at the center of the Court. Today that would
presumably mean Justice O’Connor, because she almost never dissented
in the October 2003 Term.39 The problem is that she did not decide
these cases alone, and it is unclear why those with whom she joined in
majority opinions ought to be excluded from the mainstream.
Moreover, the center can shift, and there is no guarantee that she will be
there as often next year. Nor is it clear why dissenters ought to be
excluded entirely, because dissents sometimes later become the law.
The fourth and final possibility is to define the mainstream as
39 See Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2004, at A1.
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something more dynamic and broader than a specific Court or specific
Justice at a particular moment in time. For one thing, the Court is not
alone in making constitutional law. Our political leaders make a great
deal of constitutional law, much of which eludes judicial review.40
Moreover, the Court approves the vast majority of the constitutional
decisions that it does review. It would also be wrong to assume that
every Court decision reflects mainstream constitutional values.
Sometimes the Court gets it wrong, as it did in Chisholm v. Georgia,41
Dred Scott v. Sanford,42 and Korematsu v. United States.43 The
constitutional views of presidents and senators are relevant to the
makeup of the mainstream, because they have the power to try to move
the Court in different directions or perhaps keep it on course by virtue
of their respective authority in the appointments process. They also
have the power to shape enduring policies. Consequently, it is possible
to define the mainstream as the dominant doctrine, outlook, and
thinking on constitutional law over time. The Supreme Court provides
the doctrine, the courts and national political leaders shape the outlook
of an era, and all of these along with constitutional commentators in a
wide variety of fora inform the thinking on constitutional law. This
perspective on the mainstream has the virtue of encapsulating the
constitutional activities of a given era. The main problem with this
perspective is that there is no method on which all people could agree
for determining the relevant doctrine, outlook, and thinking of a
particular era. Historians might be in the best position to give us this
information but only in retrospect. It is a challenge, to say the least, for
someone to step outside of his or own time to develop a credible
perspective on it.
III. PROVING IDEOLOGY MATTERS
Proving what many people suppose—that ideology matters more
than anything else to most presidents in nominating judges and most
senators in voting on their confirmation—is no small feat. There are a
number of complications with determining the extent to which ideology
was a major factor or the primary basis for the President’s nominating
and the Senate’s voting on the confirmation of various judicial
nominees. After briefly reviewing these, I make some modest
suggestions for future empirical analysis on the significance of ideology
40 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Court, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 775
(2003).
41 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
42 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
43 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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in the judicial selection process.
A.

Ideology’s Elusiveness

There are a number of problems with proving empirically whether
and, if so, how much ideology was a factor in the nominating or
confirmation phase. First, reaching consensus on what qualifies as
ideology is difficult. Although I understand ideology as a precommitment to certain constitutional values or to resolving particular
questions of constitutional law regardless of the facts of particular cases,
this is but one understanding.44
The second problem is that not every judicial nominee has a wellconceived or thoroughly worked-out constitutional ideology. Indeed,
judicial nominees often publicly disavow commitment to a particular
constitutional ideology. Moreover, ideology presumably functions as a
blinding mechanism, so that it is conceivable that some nominees may
not be aware that they have certain ideological commitments.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the relevance of ideology to
particular judges’ decisions or to particular confirmation decisions may
not be evident in the public record. If the President and his nominees
deny that they have particular ideological commitments, then the burden
shifts to the other side to prove them wrong. This is precisely the
dynamic with President Bush’s judicial nominees. He has publicly
defended his nominations on the ground of merit, and disavowed that he
has employed a litmus test or chosen nominees based on particular
ideological commitments.45 His nominees publicly disavow such
commitments.46 Consequently, skeptical Democrats must infer his
selection criteria—including any preference for ideological precommitments—from the kinds of nominees that he has chosen.
Moreover, most judicial nominations fail because of inaction. For
instance, the Senate in President Clinton’s final year in office failed to
act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations. There is little or no
record on these nominees, so it is not possible to prove precisely why
the Judiciary Committee did not hold hearings or votes on these
nominees.
In addition, Senate debates over nominees rarely employ the term
“ideology.” More often than not, the focus in confirmation contests has
been on such matters as the nominee’s integrity, experience,

44 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Orrin G. Hatch) (characterizing ideology as
distinctly outside of the realm of judicial decision-making as envisioned in the Constitution).
45 See Joyce Purnick, Ideology? Well, Who’s to Judge, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at B1.
46 See Raymond Hernandez, An Infuriating Success: Schumer Draws Fire for Tactics
Blocking Judicial Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2003, at B1.
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competence, and temperament.47 When the debates do shift focus to
nominees’ commitments to, or expression of, particular constitutional
views, they feature discussions about whether the nominee comes from
the “mainstream” of constitutional law.
Fourth, proving ideology matters to nominations or confirmation
decisions is complicated by the fact that these decisions are invariably
based on multiple factors. Presidents, or their counselors, usually
employ a range of criteria for making decisions on whom to nominate.48
In the Senate, a single factor is not usually determinative, because
different senators base their decisions on different factors. Nor is it
unusual for presidents and senators to base public decisions on factors
they do not disclose. It is not incumbent upon them to disclose all the
grounds for their constitutional decisions.
Moreover, presidents and senators must make different kinds of
decisions in the selection process. Because presidents are responsible
for choosing nominees, they can make decisions about which persons
they think are best qualified or best fit their selection criteria. Senators
are often able to provide input and even make specific
recommendations on nominations, but their primary responsibility is to
determine not necessarily whether the nominee is ideal or the best
qualified but rather acceptable according to whatever criteria each
senator decides is relevant. It is thus not unthinkable that one-hundred
different senators may use one-hundred different sets of criteria for
evaluating judicial nominees.
B.

How to Show Ideology Matters

The aforementioned problems are not necessarily fatal to the
enterprise of proving that ideology makes a difference to outcomes in
the confirmation process. Patterns invariably emerge within the
process. For instance, the Senate usually approves the vast majority of
a president’s judicial nominations. One could try to identify what the
nominees who have made it through the process successfully have in
common or what traits or characteristics are shared by those who have
been unsuccessful. These are not necessarily easy ventures, but they are
not impossible. For instance, social scientists such as David Yalof have
shown what they regard as the characteristics that the people nominated
to the Supreme Court over the past few decades have had in common.49
47 See Kenneth B. Noble, Hatch Assails A.B.A. Over Vote on Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1987, at A14.
48 See DAVID YALOF, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
49 See id.; Lee Epstein, et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and its Consequences
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Once one sets out to demonstrate the particular significance of a
single factor, such as ideology, the task becomes somewhat more
complicated. To make this showing, one needs, at the outset, to
determine the relevant independent and dependent variables.50 The
variable that is to be explained—in the case of the confirmation process,
the vote share, or how senators voted on particular nominations, or the
absence of a vote on a particular nomination—is the dependent variable;
it “depends” or turns on other variables. The latter are what social
scientists call independent or “explanatory” variables, because they help
to explain the dependent variable. The independent or explanatory
variables are not themselves explained by the theory one is trying to
prove; they simply do the explaining. My purpose is to clarify that, as
an empirical matter, ideology is not the outcome that needs to be
proved; instead, it is one of the variables that determines outcomes in
the confirmation process. Thus, we need to determine, even before we
can prove the hypothesis or theory underlying much of the discussion in
this symposium—that ideology matters significantly in the confirmation
process—what proxies stand for ideology and what other variables are
potentially relevant to outcomes in the confirmation process.
One cannot prove that ideology matters without initially
determining how ideology manifests itself.
The most obvious
possibilities are statements and actions of nominees that accord with, or
explicitly embrace, particular ideologies. If the nominees have been
judges, then their opinions might reflect ideologies or perhaps the
absence of them. In addition, they might have given speeches, written
articles or books, or made statements that reflect ideological
commitments or their absence. If the nominees have not been judges,
then their activities in the public or private sectors might reflect their
commitments to certain ideologies, though these can be disavowed as
merely doing the bidding of superiors or clients. More relevant for
people who have yet been judges are writings, speeches, or statements.
Also relevant may be the testimony and the support of those claiming to
know the nominees best. Put slightly differently, one might ask which
groups support nominees and why or on what bases. But people who
are not judges, even if they are academics, can credibly claim that their
public musings do not reflect what they would do as judges because
their duties as judges require them to do things, such as following
precedent, that they are not required to accept as scholars or
commentators.
It is easier to settle on the independent variables other than
ideology. The first is Senate composition. Presidents often take the
for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003).
50 For an excellent primer on statistical analysis, see RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND OTHER THINGS (2002).
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composition of the Senate into account in deciding on whom to
nominate and when. The strength of a president’s party’s representation
in the Senate is obviously important, because it determines which
parties control the Judiciary Committee, the agenda on the floor of the
Senate, and the length of debate. If the minority party controls at least
forty seats in the Senate, it can then block some judicial nominations by
filibustering them.51 Threatening filibusters or holds, which are, in
effect mini-filibusters, can sometimes influence whether and when
presidents make certain nominations.
A second factor is timing. Election years tend not to be good times
for presidents to make judicial nominations, particularly to the Supreme
Court. In the nineteenth century, the Senate did not act on at least nine
Supreme Court nominations, supposedly because the majority party was
trying to keep the vacancies open until after the next presidential
election.52 In President Clinton’s final year in office, the Senate did not
act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations.53 Similarly, the
Democratically-led Senate did not act on dozens of the first President
Bush’s judicial nominations in his final year in office, presumably
because of a desire to keep as many judicial vacancies for the next
President.54
Timing might matter in a different way. Most failed nominations
do not get so far as receiving Committee votes; they fail because of
inaction. Moreover, not all nominations that get hearings are scheduled
for Committee votes. Consequently, one needs to figure out how long a
nomination has gone without a hearing or whether it has gotten a
Committee vote within a certain period of time, presumably the average
length of a time between a nomination and a Committee vote. Those
nominations exceeding the average length of time without yet getting a
hearing or Committee vote are unlikely to be approved.
Third, sponsoring senators may make a difference to the fate of at
least some judicial nominations. The more powerful the senator, the
more likely it is that nominees he has supported will be confirmed. For
instance, the Senate has confirmed a number of nominees who worked
for Senator Hatch.55 Indeed, Senator Hatch convinced President Clinton
to nominate a former aide to a District Court in Utah, after he had held
up every other judicial nomination pending President Clinton’s
compliance.56 It also possible that sponsoring senators might signal
51
52
53

See SEN. R. XXII, available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.htm.
See ABRAHAM, supra note 15.
See Republicans Create Judicial Vacancy Crises, Then Blame Democrats, at
http://democrats.senate.gov/~dpc/pubs/107-2-75.html.
54 See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
55 Jonathan Groner, The Judge Maker, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 1.
56 See GERHARDT, supra note 10.
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nominees’ possible commitments to particular ideologies, if the senators
are well known or can be shown to prefer nominees with such
commitments.
Fourth, a president’s popularity might have an effect on a
nomination’s fate. The President’s political strength, as reflected in his
approval ratings with the public, might show the risks involved in a
fight with the President. The more closely a nomination is identified
with the President or the more it means to him or his policies, the more
likely that the popularity of the president or his policies will be an
important factor. The more popular the president or the policies with
which the nominee is associated, the more likely it is that this popularity
will benefit his nomination. The more political coinage that a president
has on which to draw in confirmation contests, the more likely it is that
senators will suffer some political damage or loss from such
confrontations. Some senators might choose contests over some
judicial nominations because they believe the conflicts can improve
their standing with important constituencies or can underscore their own
political commitments. But contests are not likely to be completely
cost-free, particularly insofar as the presidents remember them and have
the means and opportunity to seek retaliation.
A related factor may be party cohesion or fidelity. The extent to
which senators from the same party are willing to stand together on
judicial nominations makes a big difference as to whether they can
successfully filibuster or defeat nominations in Committee or on the
Senate floor. The degree of cohesion or unity within a caucus is
pertinent to how much power it can wield under the Senate rules to
strike deals with the President. Sometimes senators do not do what their
party leaders or presidents from their parties tell them to do. Sometimes
divisions in the ranks of the senators from the President’s party can be a
problem for many nominees, with some joining together with members
of the opposition party to defeat them.
The sixth factor is whether the blue-slip process is in place at time
of a nomination.57 The blue-slip process allows a senator to block a
nomination made to an office in that senator’s home state. This process
is usually available to senators from both parties, but sometimes
presidents or Senate leaders have restricted it to senators only from the
president’s party. If this process is in place in whatever form, it
expands senators’ opportunities to block nominations. It particularly
reinforces the strength of the majority party in the Senate. If that party
is targeting the expression of support for particular policies or
ideologies, then nominees who can be shown to have made such
expressions face potentially serious obstacles to their confirmation from
57 On the blue-slip process, see generally Brannon Denning, The Blue Slip: Enforcing the
Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001).
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the beginning.
Seventh, the number of witnesses called for and against
nominations is likely to be pertinent to their chances to succeed in the
confirmation process. The number of people testifying, particularly
against a nomination, is likely to signal some problem with the
nomination. Of course, numbers alone do not indicate the reasons for
support or opposition. Some people may be opposed because of their
supposed ideological commitments, but one must go behind these
numbers in order to determine this information.
Eighth, the American Bar Association’s ratings on nominees may
affect the fate of nominations. Positive ratings do not guarantee
confirmation, but negative or largely unfavorable ratings are bound to
lower considerably a nominee’s chances for confirmation. Even split
ratings can be problematic, though not necessarily fatal. The American
Bar Association comes as close as any group to providing a “neutral”
assessment of a nominee’s qualifications, and its ratings may be used by
either side in a confirmation contest depending on the extent to which
they are favorable or unfavorable.
These are just eight factors, besides ideology, that are likely to
affect the fate of judicial nominations. The odds are that nominations
will not falter simply because of one of these factors. Moreover, it is
possible, if not likely, that the stated grounds of opposition to judicial
nominations might not be entirely credible; they might reflect, at least to
some extent, a pretext to oppose a nomination. For instance, the
Judiciary Committee never acted on President Clinton’s nomination of
Elena Kagan to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in 2000. She never got a hearing, much less a vote, on her nomination,
in spite of her strong credentials. Indeed, she is now the Dean of
Harvard Law School. No one expressed opposition to her because of
her ideology. Instead, opposition, to the extent it was ever manifest in
public, focused more on whether the appellate court to which she had
been nominated had a caseload to justify filling all of the seats to which
the President had nominated people.58 Some people might view this
opposition as merely a pretext to preclude the confirmation of someone
whom the opposition party feared might be a liberal activist or who
would then occupy a seat that it would have preferred for one of its own
to occupy. After President Bush took office, Republican leaders
changed position and acknowledged the court’s caseload justified filling
all its seats.59 And President Bush then nominated Miguel Estrada to
one of them. It is possible that at least some opposition to the Estrada
58 See http://www.independentjudiciary.com/courts/courtlong/cfm?CourtID=18 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005).
59 Neil A. Lewis, Party Leasers Clash in Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A1.
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nomination derived in part from a desire for payback, though the
grounds cited by opponents related to Estrada’s temperament and
imputed judicial ideology. Although payback is another possible factor
that needs to be monitored in the confirmation process, it is hard to
verify, because senators rarely acknowledge that it is the basis for their
opposition.
In the final analysis, proving that ideology significantly affects the
fate of nominations is not easy. Proving it may be so difficult that many
people simply opt for anecdotal evidence or merely analyzing the
appeal of a particular nominee’s ideology. After all, it is not necessary
to prove that all nominees shared commitments to problematic
ideologies but rather only the ones that senators end up choosing to
oppose for stated or unstated reasons. The higher, or more powerful,
the court to which someone has been nominated, the more likely
senators will be concerned about the person’s likely judicial ideology.
In any event, as long as senators do not fear the President, senators
remain relatively free to pick and choose which nominees to oppose and
on what bases.
CONCLUSION
I close with a challenge. I challenge others to talk more openly
about merit in judicial selection and particularly whether merit can be
defined separately from ideology. If it can, then we have to wonder
why more scholars, presidents, and senators do not separately define
these concepts. If not, then we need to explain why we should not
simply join forces with the many social scientists who believe that
judges are simply policymakers who wear robes.

